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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD


17 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-23.4/1, dated 24 February 1964


SUBJECT : Revised Version of the Report of Ad Hoc
Committee for Review of Certain Problems
Related to the Central Intelligence Bulletin

REFERENCES : a. USIB-M-283, item 8, 14 August 1963
b. USIB-M-316, item 6, 11 March 1964

The United States Intelligence Board approved revised version of
the subject report is attached for your use and information. Please
substitute this revised report for the original version which was circulated
as an attachment to USIB-D-23.4/1, dated 24 February 1964.



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Executive Secretary ✓

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Attachment



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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
declassification

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14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals

SUBJECT : Daily Current Intelligence
Reporting

1. On 14 August 1963 USIB set up an ad hoc committee to examine certain problems related to the Central Intelligence Bulletin. A working group composed of representatives of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency carried out a detailed review of these problems. Its report is attached.

2. In summary, the committee has achieved the following:

a. Formalization of the relationship between the Central Intelligence Bulletin as a national-level publication and the Defense Intelligence Summary as a departmental one.

b. A full review of the inter-agency procedures used in producing the Bulletin.

c. Agreement that the present regular distribution of high-level current intelligence publications is too broad, and that certain measures are to be implemented to remedy this.

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14 February 1964

Report of the CIB Working Group

A. INTRODUCTION

1. At its meeting of 14 August 1963, USIB agreed that "an ad hoc committee consisting of representatives from CIA, State, and DIA should review the distribution and security problems related to the Central Intelligence Bulletin, as well as any related conceptual problems." The Acting CIA Member then designated R. J. Smith, Assistant Director, Current Intelligence, CIA, to convene this committee. State was represented by Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, and DIA by [redacted] Chief, Current Intelligence and Indications Center, DIA.

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2. This committee met on 5 September and agreed:

a. That there were compelling arguments against renaming the Central Intelligence Bulletin the National Intelligence Bulletin.

b. That there were a number of other problems connected with the production of daily current intelligence which required detailed examination.

c. That a working group consisting of Mr. Edward L. Davis, INR, [redacted] DIA, and Mr. Richard Lehman, CIA, should carry out this examination.

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3. The working group held a number of meetings between 10 September and 20 November 1963, on the following agenda established by its parent committee:

a. Changes in the "legend"* of the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB).

*By "legend" is meant the paragraphs explaining the publication's purpose which appear inside its front cover.

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b. Review of procedures in the production of the CIB.

c. Review of the dissemination of the CIB and Defense Intelligence Summary (DIS) in relation to the sensitivity of information contained therein.

4. The working group's discussions and recommendations on these topics are summarized in Sections B-D of this report.

B. LEGEND OF THE CIB

5. There were three purposes in amending the CIB legend. One was to reflect more clearly that the publication was produced to meet CIA's responsibilities under NSCID #3 for serving the President and the National Security Council. (DIA had, by earlier agreement with CIA, changed the corresponding legend of the Defense Intelligence Summary (DIS) to indicate its departmental status.) Another purpose was to define more accurately the method used for indicating CIA's sole responsibility for a late item. The third was to bring the language of the legend in line with changes which have been made in the format of the CIB since its establishment in 1958.

6. These considerations apply only to the first paragraph of the present legend, which reads as follows:

"The Daily Brief of the Central Intelligence Bulletin is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with representatives of departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable, the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including COMINT."

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7. The working group recommends that the following revised first paragraph be adopted:

"The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk."

C. PRODUCTION PROCEDURES FOR THE CIB

8. There have been far-reaching changes in organization, philosophy, and procedure within the Intelligence Community in the nearly six years since the CIB began publication in its present form. Procedures for producing the CIB have evolved to reflect these changes. Furthermore, with accumulated experience there has grown up a body of doctrine on CIB production which is not fully understood throughout the Community. The working group has devoted considerable time to an examination of procedures and the doctrine underlying them.

9. The CIB is produced six days a week by the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA. Drafts of proposed items are prepared by OCI analysts and disseminated electrically to INR and DIA. At 1515 each day, Sunday through Friday, a panel chaired by CIA and including representatives of INR and DIA meets to consider drafts of all items available at that time. Following this meeting there is additional telephonic contact extending to 1700-1800. At the end of this consultation process, there exists a text for the following morning's CIB acceptable to all three agencies, in which any dissents are indicated. Items prepared by CIA too late for the completion of this process are either included with an asterisk to show that consultation has not taken place or are held over

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for consultation the following day. Such items may be prepared as late as 0430 on the morning of publication. Responsibility for the content of an issue rests with its Panel Chairman, who is one of a group of senior OCI officers rotating in this role.

10. INR requested CIA to table papers defining the criteria used by the Panel Chairman in selecting items, in deciding whether to run a late item, and in handling dissents. CIA prepared such papers, which were then discussed and amended. The Working Group recommends that these revised papers (Annexes A-C) be circulated to all personnel of the three agencies who are concerned with the substantive content of the CIB. It notes, however, that they are to be considered guidelines for the Panel Chairman in handling a wide variety of problems, rather than rules which can and will be applied rigidly in every case.

11. The working group has also given considerable attention to the problem of circulating drafts and raw materials early enough for consultation. It recognizes that there can be no hard-and-fast solution, but recommends that:

a. CIA ensure that its producing elements are generating drafts as soon as possible after receipt of reportable raw material. (CIA has done this.)

b. INR and DIA assist in this process by notifying CIA when they receive raw material they believe should be treated in the CIB. (INR has begun to do so.)

c. The three agencies work to ensure the most rapid possible exchange of reportable raw material.

d. CIA examine the procedures for electrical transmission of drafts to see where time could be saved. (CIA has done so and finds that, with a few exceptions, drafts are transmitted as fast as present arrangements will permit. It is preparing to make changes in its own internal communications procedures

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which will reduce average transmission time by perhaps 15 minutes. It recommends that, as a long-run solution, consideration be given to use of the enciphered facsimile system now under development.)

e. Greater use be made of informal consultation by telephone, especially analyst-to-analyst. (The group notes that this is a standard practice both between CIA and DIA, where the gray telephone system is available, and between CIA and INR. In the latter case, however, consultation has been more difficult, since INR's access to secure telephones is limited. The group recommends, nevertheless, that INR analysts make greater use of the gray phones available to them. In the longer run, consideration should be given to use of the oncoming KY-3 system for INR-CIA consultation on non-STGINT matters.)

12. A number of other problems were also discussed at lesser length.

a. CIA noted difficulties which had on occasion arisen in attempting to consult with INR because of lack of coordination within INR or lack of understanding by INR analysts of the purpose and philosophy of the CIB. INR has taken measures to improve this situation.

b. INR asked whether a more systematic way could be found to cover in the CIB situations which were potentially dangerous but in which nothing normally reportable was happening. CIA noted that purely mechanical systems for doing this had been tried unsuccessfully in the past, but agreed to re-examine the problem.

D. DISSEMINATION AND SENSITIVITY

13. As of 1 October 1963, the CIB and DIS were disseminated as follows (for details see Annex D):

a. Within the Washington area, 187 hard copies of the CIB are circulated outside CIA, and 209 hard copies of the DIS are circulated outside DIA. In addition, for speed and convenience the two publications are circulated electrically to a number of Washington organizations which also receive hard copies. The CIB has 13 such addressees, the DIS 16.

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b. The hard copies are disseminated as follows:

	<u>CIB</u>	<u>DIS</u>
White House	16	7
State	15	14
Defense (except NSA)	132	79*
Treasury	2	0
Justice	4	1
CIA	*	88
Budget	1	0
AEC	1	0
USIA	1	0
NASA	1	0
NSA	11	14
NIC	3	6

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14. These figures understate the true readership of the two publications. Many copies of each have several readers. Of necessity, all copies pass through the hands of information control and clerical personnel, and teletype copies pass through communications centers. Finally, it should be noted that

*In addition the producing offices disseminate 127 copies of the CIB and 34 copies of the DIS within their respective organizations.

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teletypes normally print out in multiple copies. On the other hand, many recipients, both in Washington and in the field, read both publications.

15. Both the CIB and DIS are designed for a high-level readership, and contain intelligence based on sensitive materials. At the same time, both are widely used as a daily current intelligence service for other officials at a lower level, both in Washington and to a much greater extent in the field.*

16. The working group believes that daily comprehensive current intelligence service is essential for the major Washington agencies involved in national security and for their missions and headquarters abroad. Moreover, it believes centralized production of current intelligence in Washington is a more efficient and economical method than decentralized production in the field of an assortment of daily summaries not backed by the information flow and analytic resources available in Washington. However, certain materials contained in the present hard-copy CIB and DIS may be too sensitive for regular dissemination to all readers currently carried on CIB and DIS dissemination lists. Specifically, the two publications contain material based on Department of State "Limit Distribution" and CIA Clandestine Service "Background Use Only" cables, both of which are considered by their originating agencies to be highly sensitive. (The CIB and DIS also occasionally include other sensitive material, but only on an ad hoc basis.)

17. Thus the present system results in the dissemination of sensitive information to a number of

*There are certain differences between the hard copy and cable versions of the two publications. The CIB cable version which leaves the Washington area does not contain "No Dissem Abroad" items. The DIS cable rarely includes sensitive materials and these only upon authorization of the controlling agencies.

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consumers who may not need it on a regular basis. At the same time, the producer of the CIB is sometimes inhibited from giving the most complete policy-oriented service to his primary high-level consumers by the knowledge that what he writes will be given a wide circulation.

18. The recommendations which follow are designed to rectify this situation by enabling the hard-copy CIB and DIS to be prepared solely for those who have a clearly established need to know.

19. The working group recommends:

a. That material based on the "Limited Distribution" and "Background Use Only" series not as a rule be used in the cable versions of the CIB and DIS and that any exception be negotiated with the controlling agency.

b. That CIA and DIA coordinate to identify, on an ad hoc basis, any other items of sensitive intelligence which should be limited to hard-copy distribution.

c. That hard-copy distribution be limited to officials of the national security policy-making apparatus and to other officials whose day-to-day duties are such that they have a regular need to know. (This should not be interpreted as limiting the right of any USIB agency to disseminate individual items of sensitive intelligence to other officials in Washington or in the field with an absolute need to know.)

d. That CIA and DIA, with the cooperation of the other USIB agencies, undertake a substantial reduction in the number of hard copies of the CIB and DIS, in the range of 20 to 40 percent if feasible.

e. That a new technical working group be appointed to coordinate and monitor d. and to produce a coordinated plan for dissemination of the CIB and DIS cables to field installations.

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29 October 1963

CIB Working Group Report
Annex A

Criteria for Selection of CIB Items

1. There are three basic criteria which all CIB items must meet.

a. They must be concerned with national security. The definition of "national security" used in the US Government is so broad, however, that the formula gives virtually no guidance to the selector. It merely requires that an item present information pertaining to developments --potential or actual--which impinge fairly directly on important interests of the US.

b. They must present intelligence. This means that they must deal primarily with foreign actions or policies rather than those of the US. This distinction is not easy to maintain, however, since the conduct of foreign affairs is a continuous process of action and reaction between the US and other nations. It is most difficult to discuss a foreign action, for instance, without relating it--either implicitly or explicitly--to the US action which stimulated it.

c. They must be important enough to be worth the attention of members of the National Security Council. In other words, an item must deal with a matter which is now or has the potential of becoming the subject of consideration at the Presidential or NSC level. This criterion is exceptionally difficult to define further because of the large element of subjective judgment built into it. Furthermore, the interest of high-level readers will vary from day to day and individual to individual.

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2. Beyond these theoretical considerations, there are also a number of practical ones. The day-to-day make-up of the CIB is largely determined by the interplay of the following factors:

a. Degree of government interest. When the policy-making apparatus has focussed its attention on a crisis, its appetite for detail is insatiable. Items are printed in the CIB which would in normal times never be considered. On the other hand, lack of high-level interest in a potentially dangerous situation can often be a reason for periodically calling attention to it. Since such situations can remain unchanged for months, this sometimes requires the use of a relatively unimportant piece of new information as a "peg" on which to hang what is basically a repetitive reminder that the problem continues to exist.

b. Continuity. CIA must ask itself whether each piece of raw information records a new development or adds detail to one already recorded in the CIB, and whether it tends to change or to reinforce assessments already published. When something is new or when a judgment should be changed, there is pressure to publish in the CIB. This is especially true if the direction of events is running counter to a National Intelligence Estimate. On the other hand, crises which simmer along for several days with no detectable change must not be allowed to drop out of sight. There is a danger that the policy-maker, seeing no intelligence reporting, might assume that the situation is improving. Pressure therefore builds up to report even when no significant information has been received.

c. Timeliness. Items otherwise important enough for the CIB may be withheld because the events they predict are scheduled to occur before the CIB is distributed or because the government has already reacted to the information. Items may also be withheld because they are so long-range that delay for one reason or another will do no harm.

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d. Open-source Reporting. If incoming raw intelligence is paralleled by accurate press reporting, pressures for CIB publication may be decreased. On the other hand, if press reporting is contradictory, incomplete, or inaccurate, items of lesser importance may be selected for CIB treatment in order to clarify situations for the reader.

e. Length. There are no limits on length of the CIB, but CIA believes that high-level readership will be overloaded if the normal CIB runs much beyond a dozen items a day. Of course, all items of obvious importance are printed, but it is also true that an item of marginal importance is more likely to be printed on a day when the CIB is short than on one when it is long.

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29 October 1963

CIB Working Group Report
Annex B

Late Items in the CIB

1. The formal basis for use of the asterisk to denote a late CIB item is contained in the present legend of the CIB, which states that "When, because of the time factor, consultation with the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable, the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk." When the present CIB was established in early 1958, this language was inserted to provide a way for the CIB to be adjusted to major late developments. It was believed that the text of each issue would be virtually complete by about 1600 each day, when the inter-agency CIB Panel meeting ended. Substantive disagreements would also be established by that time and would be handled by dissents.

2. For this to work as originally intended, allowing time for the preparations of drafts by CIA, for circulation of these drafts, and for consideration of them by other agencies, an issue of the CIB had to be based largely on material received in CIA by 1100 the previous day. The intelligence provided the reader would thus be 24-48 hours old before he received it.

3. It has become increasingly difficult to follow this rather deliberate approach. There are contradictions inherent in any attempt to coordinate, or "consult on" current intelligence, and these contradictions are sharpened as the requirement for currency increases. Over the years, the pace of events has accelerated and the government's reaction time has been sharply cut. Raw intelligence is collected and transmitted in much greater volume with much higher speed, requiring a parallel increase in the speed of processing and delivery to consumers. The result has been an increasing number of items on which consultation is not possible and therefore

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an increasing use of the asterisk to denote production by CIA alone. This trend has been apparent even though in practice the consultation process is often less deliberate and regularly extends well beyond the Panel meeting into the early evening.

4. The Panel Chairman, under heavy pressure from the CIB readership for currency, may decide to include an "asterisked item" in any of the following circumstances:

a. An item generated by information received too late for Panel consideration. Present practice differs from the original concept in that items can now be drafted based on sources received as late as 1500, brought before the Panel, and afterwards cleared with INR and DIA. If an item cannot be brought before the Panel at all, an asterisk is usually used. However, in the interests of currency, CIA's standards for the level of urgency and importance which justifies production of a late item have gradually been lowered. Such an item will usually be prepared if delay until the next issue of the CIB will substantially reduce the government's ability to react to the information therein, if delay will probably cause the information to be overtaken, or if the topic of the item is likely to receive heavy press treatment the following morning.

b. An item brought before the Panel on schedule, but on which another agency is unable to consult. This situation arises, for example, when CIA has prepared an item based on source material which analysts in another agency have either not yet received or not yet had time to analyze fully. CIA goes ahead with production of such items when it believes that a day's delay for consultation will lessen their usefulness to the reader.

c. Portions of an item passed by the Panel which are changed or added by CIA at night on the basis of later information. Such changes for the sake of accuracy or completeness are almost always factual, and can be

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triggered by receipt of information which would not justify production of a new late item.

d. A fast-moving crisis situation. Under crisis circumstances, CIA seeks to prepare CIB material at the latest possible moment, since intelligence which is valid in the afternoon may be out of date the following morning. Consultation, except for informal discussion between night duty officers, is normally not feasible on such items. However, their content is usually of the "classified newspaper" variety, seeking to give the reader a short coherent account of what has transpired with a minimum of interpretation or assessment. It would theoretically be possible for such items to be drafted in time for Panel consideration, with the idea that some portions of them would stand up twelve hours later. This, however, is an inefficient use of scarce and--especially under the circumstances--overworked manpower, and CIA does not attempt it. On the other hand, CIA tries to return to a normal reporting schedule as soon as the situation will permit.

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29 October 1963

CIB Working Group Report
Annex C

Dissents in the CIB

1. Next to accuracy, the most important factor in the usefulness of current intelligence is timeliness. If timeliness is to be achieved, it is simply not possible or desirable to indulge in lengthy, drawn-out sessions for the coordination of inter-departmental views. The CIB is not the forum in which to resolve basic differences of views with respect to the situation in Ruritania. On the other hand, the existence of basic differences must not be permitted to block publication of significant current intelligence.

2. In general, the nature of current reporting is such that basic differences on substantive matters do not often arise. Most CIB reporting deals in a largely factual way with current developments, which it interprets or places in the context of other current developments or factual reports. Such interpretative analysis is understood to be preliminary and subject to refinement as further data are received. While there is room for differences in the selection of facts and their interpretation, these are seldom life-and-death matters and in most instances can be resolved informally by working-level contacts between the agencies.

3. "Assessments" or projections in the CIB occur less frequently and are normally short-range. These are often conveyed more by the factual background against which a new piece of intelligence is presented than by a direct statement. While the chances of dissent are possibly greater when an "assessment" is contained in a CIB item, this is only likely to occur where a sharp difference exists within the government which has not been resolved by NIE's or other basic efforts to thrash out the problem.

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4. When such a situation arises, it has been and remains CIA's policy that a dissent will be published. CIA further recognizes the right of the dissenting agency to state its objections in its own language. It assumes, of course, that dissents will be written in such a way as to be genuinely useful to the high-level reader. This means that:

a. Footnotes should take issue with major points of substantive interpretation. Major because the hurried policy-maker should not be distracted from the main point by inter-agency disagreements over nuances of wording which--without the dissent--would have no impact on him either way. The footnote causes him to stop and look for some implication he has missed. Substantive because the policy-maker should not be asked to referee disagreements over policy or jurisdiction within the Intelligence Community. Interpretation because facts (including the fact of the existence of a report) are ascertainable or checkable. If challenged on fact by another agency, CIA will do everything possible to check it; there should never be a need for dissent. The validity of a particular report is, however, a proper subject for dissent.

b. Footnotes should assist the high-level reader to understand the issue. Thus they must be addressed to the substance and not directly or indirectly to the competence or jurisdiction of the drafter. The consumer is not helped by a simple statement that one agency or another takes issue with an item in the CIB, nor is he usually helped by proposals for alternate language. For a dissent to be useful, it must say with some degree of specificity why the drafting agency disagrees. It must refer specifically to evidence not contained in the basic item, perhaps citing examples, or point to alternate interpretations of evidence.

5. The Panel Chairman, faced with the decision of another agency to dissent, has three choices: to print the dissent, to hold the item over, or to withdraw it. Some of the practical considerations which influence his decision are:

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a. Timeliness of the information. If delay will not seriously degrade the usefulness of an item and if additional consultation or the expected receipt of clarifying information will help to resolve a disagreement, holding-over is desirable.

b. Time available for consultation. If a dissent is surfaced early enough in the working day, senior personnel of CIA and the dissenting agency can override minor disagreements.

c. Wording of the dissent. If a proposed footnote does not meet the criteria set forth above, the Chairman must try to persuade the submitter to change it or must consider delaying publication. When a draft footnote is not received until well into the evening, his problem is compounded.

d. Effectiveness of the dissent. The Chairman is expected not to block publication of opposing views if these would be useful to the reader. Often, however, he will find that the dissenting views of another agency are well taken, but that acceptance of them leaves no positive intelligence to print, e.g. the dissenter makes a good case that the CIA analyst's evidence does not support any conclusion.

e. Importance of the item. If any item is of marginal importance to begin with, the Chairman may feel that its publication with a dissent would destroy any usefulness it might have had to the reader as well as exaggerate its importance.

6. Should another agency submit an item to CIA for inclusion in the CIB, the considerations above generally apply. However, CIA cannot itself dissent. Therefore, should a difference of views exist which would normally warrant a dissent, it is incumbent on CIA to publish an item setting forth its views, from which the other agency can dissent.

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7. Corollary to the right of other agencies to dissent from CIA's views is the obligation of those agencies not to block CIB publication of intelligence controlled by them, even when they do not agree with it. Denying clearance of field cables for use in the CIB for such reasons can result in the suppression of intelligence.

8. Finally, the application of the footnote system to current intelligence requires large measures of goodwill, flexibility, common sense, and firm supervision in all participating agencies.

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ANNEX D

1. Consumers in the
Washington Area

	CIB		DIS	
	HARD	ELEC	HARD	ELEC
WHITE HOUSE	16	X	7	
STATE	15	X	14	X
TREASURY	2			
JUSTICE	4		1	
USIA	1			
BUDGET	1			
NASA	1			
AEC	1			
CIA	--	--	88	X
NIC	3		6	
DOD---				
OSD-JCS-DIA	60	X	26*	--
NSA	11	X	14	X
ACSI (for HQ, DA)	30	X	10	X
SSO, FT. BELVOIR		X	1	X
ARMY MAP SERVICE			2	X
ARMY TECH INTEL AGENCIES (AHS)		X	2	X
HQ, 2ND ARMY, FT. MEADE			1	X
SSO, GRAVELY POINT		X		X
SSO, FT. RITCHIE		X		X
AFSSO (for HQ. USAF)	25	X	15	X
AFSSOP, FT. MEADE	2	X	2	X
GMAIC (Supplied by USAF)			1	
AF SYSTEMS COMMAND		X	1	X
AF SPECIAL BRIEFING POUCHES			2	
ONI (for DEPT. of NAVY)	15	X	14	X
COM MARINE CORPS			1	X
DIR, NAVAL SECURITY GP				X
TOTALS	187	13	208	16

*Does not include DIA internal.

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